JNS
As Beijing-Jerusalem relations sour, experts say New Delhi's growing partnership offers the Jewish state strategic and economic alternatives.
There’s never a truly excellent moment for a diplomatic crisis with the world’s largest exporter.
Yet the current nadir in China-Israel relations, brought on by the war in Gaza, may offer a silver lining: It could accelerate Israel’s growing partnership with India.
That was the assessment of several experts at the Annual Conference on Israel’s China Policy, organized in Tel Aviv by the SIGNAL Group, a think tank that seeks to help Israel address China's rising international status.
The deterioration in ties with Beijing, highlighted by China’s delayed and low-level condemnation of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, massacres, coincides with an unprecedented warming of relations between Jerusalem and New Delhi.
Ashok Malik, chair of the India Practice at The Asia Group and a U.S.-based expert on India’s strategic partnerships, told JNS that despite risks, Israel has historically found it necessary to cooperate with China, a key trading partner of both Iran and Russia and a global adversary of the United States. China’s manufacturing prowess and its capacity to scale Israeli innovation have made it an attractive but dangerous partner.
This relationship has exposed Israel to significant vulnerabilities: tensions with the U.S., risks of industrial espionage, and strategic dependence on a Communist regime that critics describe as having imperialist ambitions. Chinese private-sector tech services have also been found to include “backdoors” in systems they integrate abroad.
“But nowadays, there are countries in the region with which Israel can work. India is one. Maybe Singapore is another,” Malik said.
He was referring to India’s foreign policy shift under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, elected in 2014, who has transformed the country’s stance from Cold War-era alignment with the Arab world to a more pro-Israel one.
Under Modi, India and Israel have significantly deepened their strategic, economic and defense ties, cooperation driven by shared security concerns and technological collaboration. Bilateral trade has surged, more than doubling since 2013 to a record-breaking $5 billion in 2024.
Israel's minister of innovation, science and technology, Gila Gamliel, acknowledged the rapprochement, advocating in her speech at the May 29 conference for a "full strategic partnership” with India. She noted that Beijing has "closer ties with Iran" and that the U.S. views China as a "strategic threat."
While Israel’s trade with China remains larger than Israel's trade with India—$14 billion in Chinese goods were imported in 2024, accounting for 15% of Israel’s total imports (compared to $9 billion from the U.S.)—Malik emphasized that Israel does not need to reduce trade with China across the board.
“Importing Chinese kitchenware, metal, agricultural equipment and mechanical hardware is all fine. It’s Chinese technology and infrastructure that needs diversifying,” he said. “Because China isn’t a problem until it becomes one. Israelis are too distant from China to have learned this lesson, that China’s neighbors know very well.”
Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has sought global dominance through economic, political, military and technological means. It claims more than 90% of the South China Sea, where it has constructed artificial islands with military bases in contested waters, triggering tensions with the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia.
China also dismantled Hong Kong’s autonomy after the 2019 protests by imposing a sweeping National Security Law. It continues to escalate threats against Taiwan with military and cyber pressure.
While India-Israel trade has shown consistent growth, commerce with China has fluctuated. A sharp 18% decline in 2023 followed the Oct. 7 attacks, amid broader geopolitical instability in Israel and a drop in Chinese exports to the West, according to Tomer Fadlon of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies.
China has hardened its rhetoric against Israel since the outbreak of the current Gaza war and the subsequent regional escalations involving Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah and militias in Syria. In May, China’s ambassador to the U.N., Geng Shuang, attended a Nakba Day commemoration—an annual event marking what Palestinians call the “catastrophe” of Israel’s creation. Chinese officials have since claimed that Israel’s actions in Gaza “could constitute war crimes.”
India’s approach has contrasted sharply. In 2020, India abstained for the first time on a U.N. resolution condemning Israeli actions in Gaza. Indian officials now openly refer to Hamas as a terrorist organization—a term they once avoided. In 2017, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel. He and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu famously walked barefoot together on a beach to inspect a desalination facility. Netanyahu reciprocated the following year with a six-day visit to India.
The Israel-India relationship is poised for another leap forward through the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a U.S.-backed initiative to link India with Europe via the Middle East. “For us, IMEC is not possible without Israel, without Haifa, without those connections,” Malik said. “But sometimes I feel India is more ambitious for Israel than Israel is for itself.”
Israel’s continuing infrastructure ties with China may pose challenges for IMEC. “Do you really want the Chinese building your infrastructure? Do you want to drive their electric cars, which are data ingesters?” Malik asked.
One example of these concerns: The Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) began a 25-year concession in 2021 to operate Haifa Bayport—a new container facility in Haifa—investing around $1 billion to expand its capabilities. The decision has drawn scrutiny from both Israeli and U.S. security officials.
Haifa Port and Ashdod Port process most of Israel's international trade.
During the conference, Carice Witte, founder and executive director of the SIGNAL group (an acronym for Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership) asked China’s ambassador to Israel why it had taken until May 10, 2025, for Beijing to issue any condemnation of Hamas’s Oct. 7 atrocities.
Ambassador Xiao Junzheng, who issued that condemnation in a television interview with i24 News, avoided answering directly, stating instead: “Hamas’s violent attacks were unacceptable, so we condemn it,” and adding, “At the same time, the whole world, including China, are so concerned of the situation in Gaza and oppose the acts that resulted in heavy casualties among Gaza civilians.”
Xiao also said: “No matter how the situation in this region or in the world changes, China's commitment to develop our traditional friendship remains unchanged.”
Gamliel, Israel's innovation minister, addressed both the China dilemma and the Indian opportunity in her speech at the event.
She announced the launch of a strategic policy in the Indo-Pacific, “where China seeks to expand its influence and is viewed by the U.S. as a strategic threat.” She highlighted Beijing’s “closer ties with Iran,” adding, “China is not our enemy, but it is America’s rival and Iran is our enemy.”
On India, Gamliel was emphatic: “With its rise as a global power,” Israel should continue to strengthen “our strong ties with India, which we should develop into a full strategic partnership,” including “joint defense research and development with India, Japan and South Korea.”
