By Ray Hartley & Greg Mills, JNS
The lesson from its path to stability and recognition is understood by democrats everywhere, including by the two-thirds of Africans who routinely state their preference for democracy over other forms of government.
Israel’s move to recognize Somaliland is smart, strategic, and for the independent former British colony, overdue. It should open the door to greater recognition, in spite of the negative but hypocritical reaction of the African Union to Jerusalem’s diplomatic step. It also aligns Israel with African democracies, where it belongs.
Somaliland went to the polls on Nov. 13, 2024, in the ninth competitive election since its redeclaration of independence from Somalia in 1991—a constitutional referendum in 1991 followed by municipal elections (2002, 2012 and 2021), presidential elections (2003, 2010 and 2017) and parliamentary elections (2005).
Somaliland’s roots lie in the agreements signed between the United Kingdom and clans in the area in the late 19th century, which led to the establishment of the Somaliland Protectorate. On June 26, 1960, the protectorate was formally granted independence and became the State of Somaliland. Five days after gaining independence, it voluntarily united with the Trust Territory of Somalia, the former Italian colony to its east and south, thereby forming the Somali Republic.
The union was problematic from the start. When Somalia’s Siad Barre regime enacted harsh policies against Somaliland’s dominant clan family—the Isaaq—a 10-year war of independence ensued. The bitter conflict resulted in 90% of Somaliland’s capital city, Hargeisa, being bombed by Siad Barre’s air force and stripped bare by looters.
Somaliland defeated Mogadishu’s forces and declared independence in 1991, regarding itself as the legitimate successor state to British Somaliland.
In the absence of Mogadishu’s acquiescence, the independence of Somaliland is not internationally recognized. Yet Somaliland has created one of the most inclusive multiparty democratic systems in Africa. Not only was the 2024 event the fourth presidential election by universal suffrage in Somaliland, but previous elections have resulted in transitions of power between parties. In the May 2021 legislative and municipal elections, the ruling Kulmiye Peace, Unity and Development Party of President Muuse Biixi Cabdi won fewer seats than the opposition alliance of the Waddani National Party and the Justice Welfare Party in a tightly fought contest.
In the 2024 election, which had an expected turnout of over one million people across 2,000 polling stations, incumbent President Muse Bihi Abdi was defeated by Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro.”
The former British colony has been a stand-out democratic performer in a region characterised by political upheaval, not least in neighbouring Ethiopia and Somaliland’s one-time state partner, Somalia.
Somaliland has proven remarkably adept at managing a very poor economy, with a per capita income of just $630—poverty worsened by the civil war in the late 1980s. With aid flows by 2024 amounting to less than $200 million annually, and livestock and other trade comprising the rest of the bulk of domestic export earnings and GDP, at some $300 million, the country depends on remittance flows from the diaspora, around $900 million annually.
And yet, Somalia has similar customs and institutions, the same religion, and both are formed around clans. Profiting from chaos and destruction has become a way of business and life in neighboring Somalia. The flow of international largesse, averaging $2 billion annually for 20 years in the 2000s, has made this an attractively profitable venture. Clan control of the capital, Mogadishu, has, in this regard, equated with the control of the sources and distribution of revenue.
There are some other differences. The specific clan structure in Somaliland is dominated by the Isaaq clan, comprising two-thirds of the population, unlike Somalia, which is dominated by five clans.
Colonial history is also a factor—Somaliland under the British, and Somalia under the Italians. The former ruled more indirectly through retained local power structures than the latter.
Another explanation is down to the presence of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somaliland, which took charge in 1991 as soon as independence was redeclared—this time not from Britain, as in 1960, but from Somalia. A nearly month-long conference under the trees in the southeastern city of Burao in April-May 1991 revoked Somaliland’s voluntary union with the rest of Somalia to form the “Republic of Somaliland.” A 1993 conference in Boroma extended government beyond the SNM.
Another reason is the democratic character of Somaliland. In 2001, Somaliland voters approved a new constitution that established a multiparty democracy, based on three major parties in a deal that is renewed every 10 years. Even though Somaliland is a functioning sovereign state with an elected government and its own currency, it is not internationally recognized. The frequent transfers of power between candidates, despite some very tight results, have made Somaliland a stand-out African democracy. As such, it’s a better fit for Israel than some of the autocracies with which the Israeli government has invested, including Rwanda and Uganda.
The lack of international recognition has until now added a premium to costs, especially insurance and banking, while its strongest asset in democracy has added a relatively large burden of some $10 million every year to a budget which is just $400 million, of which security accounted for 43% in 2024, and payroll much of the remainder. Democracy has, however, ensured relative transparency compared to Somalia, in addition to accountability.
Neighboring Ethiopia, which always said that, due to its common border, it could never “be the first to recognize Hargeisa, but would be the second,” in 2024 concluded an agreement on a 50-year lease on the Red Sea port of Berbera, run by Dubai Ports.
Israel’s move acknowledges the political, security and legal realities of the Horn of Africa, whatever the protests of the African Union, which bases this argument on the 1964 Cairo Resolution on the inviolability of African borders. However, the AU’s own 2005 report on Somaliland found that its recognition was “historically unique and self-justified in African political history.” Recognition does not create a new border but strengthens an existing one.
The lesson from Somaliland’s path to stability and recognition is well understood by democrats everywhere, including the two-thirds of Africans who routinely state their preference for democracy over other forms of government. Such openness may be expensive with regular elections and transfers of power, but it’s also cheap at the price.
